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       Abstract 
 
Extending the concept of speech act, as it has been developed in classic pragmatics, I have defined the ‘pragmatic 
act’ as an interactive communicative practice in which we determine, and are determined by, the entire context of 
communication (See Mey 2002, chapters 8 & 9). Applying this notion to poetics, I want to establish the concept of 
the ‘poetic act’ by which we create the fictional universe called the ‘poetic space’. The poetic (or more generally, the 
literary) space is where authors and readers meet; furthermore, the poetic (or more generally, the literary) pragmatic 
act creates the ‘chronotope’ (to use Bakhtin’s expression) that characterizes the poetic context in time and space. 
The co-creators of this chronotope communicate by using their ‘voices’, understood as the entirety of their 
time/space affordances as authors and readers, aka. producers and consumers of the literary product. I will illustrate 
my ideas by analyzing a few texts: a sonnet by the Brazilian poet Carlos Drummond de Andrade, Fraga e sombra; an 
extract from Virginia Woolf’s novel Jacob’s Room; a work, Surfaces, by the contemporary US poet Peter Meinke; 
and finally a poem by the late US writer John Updike, entitled Commencement, Pingree School. 
 
 
1. Breaking the Seal 
 
Instructions on a package of software 
usually contain a reference to property rights 
(of the software producer/distributor) and to 
obligations (of the prospective user). The 
language in questions reads more or less as 
follows: 
 
“By opening this package, you agree to all 
the conditions as set forth in the 
accompanying agreement for use of this 
software.” 
 
The ‘accompanying agreement’ is in the 
form of a normal business contract, except 
that it need not be signed nor can it be 
negotiated. Thus, it is a ‘package deal’ in 
more than one sense; in addition, the 
agreement is entered into by the one part 
performing a specific action, viz. that of 
opening the package. No signature is needed 
nor required (or in fact possible to obtain, 
given the conditions of sale in this particular 
instance).  
 
Breaking the seal on this package leads the 
user into a contractual universe, where one’s 
behavior and actions are subject to a set of 
rules, not all of which are specified in the 
accompanying brochures. In every society, 
there is a corpus of legality that specifies 
individual contractors' rights and 
obligations; these may differ from society to 
society, even from sector to sector in a 
particular society. Thus, there are specific 
rules that determine the legality of actions 
performed by a doctor in a hospital; in many 
countries, patients have to ‘sign their rights 
away' before they can be treated or operated 
on. In this way, the hospital and the 
physicians safeguard themselves against 
malpractice suits and their disastrous 
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financial consequences. Surrounding these 
particular segments of society is the law-at-
large, which specifies penalties for certain 
categories of crimes such as (in)voluntary 
manslaughter (a law that is often invoked 
when medical malpractice is alleged to have 
led to the death of a patient). 
 
By breaking the package seal, the user 
implicitly accepts to obey these rules, and 
subjects him- or herself to the penalties that 
s/he may incur when the rules are broken 
(e.g. by using the software illicitly, copying 
it, transferring it to an unauthorized user and 
so on). There is no doubt that the user is 
engaged in some kind of act, which 
normally would be classified under one of 
the Searlean categories of speech acts (most 
likely a commissive, like that of 
‘promising’). But rather than considering the 
speech act in isolation, I suggest that this 
kind of act, just like all other acts of 
communication, only makes sense when 
placed in its ‘total context’ (to borrow an 
expression coined by Saussure himself, who 
most likely did not realize the full pragmatic 
implications of this term). What we are 
dealing with here is what I have called a 
‘pragmatic act’: an instance of human 
behavior that is ‘boxed in’ by a variety of 
constraints and typified in a special way, 
depending on the context; when we focus 
exclusively on the verbal part of the act, we 
are close to what traditionally is called a 
‘speech act’. 
 
 
2. The Total Context 
 
In the previous section, I said that the act of 
breaking the seal on a package of software 
only can be properly understood, and have 
validity in a legal sense, when placed in the 
total context of the act. By this, I mean that 
the act, taken by itself, does not involve 
anything except a rather insignificant 
physical action of removing a piece of paper 
from a cover; it is first when we read the 
accompanying text on the package (“By 
removing this seal, you agree …” etc.) that 
the full intended meaning of the act becomes 
clear. 
 
But whose intention are we talking about 
here? Clearly, the originators of the 
message, the software company or it 
distributors, intend to impose a legally 
binding obligation on the user, viz.: not to 
use the software except in accordance with 
the prescribed behavior for users (including 
the restrictions on dissemination and the like 
that I mentioned earlier).  I will not discuss 
the legal status of such an obligation, even 
though I have a feeling that we are moving 
around in a gray zone of undefined legal 
constraints here; after all, this way of 
dealing with, and selling, commodities is 
quite new.  
 
The closest I can come up with in the line of 
historical precedents is the way merchants in 
earlier times used to send shipments ‘for 
inspection': commodities such as Persian 
rugs, ladies’ clothing, books etc. were 
delivered to a prospective buyer, who could 
then, at his or her leisure, examine the goods 
and either purchase or return them without 
penalty or extra cost. In these cases, no 
written legal documents accompanied the 
shipments; by a gentleman’s agreement the 
prospective buyer would refrain from 
damaging the goods, using them for other 
purposes than testing their quality and value, 
or even failing to return them. One could for 
instance not lend the books to friends, or 
start wearing the clothing that one didn’t 
want to buy in the end. All of this was 
implicitly understood, and no special ‘acts’ 
were needed to create an obligation (which 
probably would not be enforceable anyway). 
The sole force of the agreement resided in 
the conventional context of dealing with a 
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high-class purveyor of luxury goods, with 
whom the prospective buyer probably had a 
long-standing business acquaintance; this 
acquaintance basically constituted the ‘total 
context’ in which these transactions were 
carried out. 
 
3. Consuming a Poetic ‘Commodity’  
 
Characteristic for the pragmatic act of 
breaking the seal is the active participation 
of the consumer who, by performing a 
simple manual operation, enters into a 
binding contract with the purveyor of the 
sealed commodity. This parallel from the 
world of business can teach us something 
about another context of ‘breaking a seal’: 
that in which a poetic ‘sealed’ commodity is 
provided to a consumer on specific 
conditions that are not normally part of a 
regular ‘buy-sell’ situation; this context 
likewise implies the consumer’s implicit 
acceptance of such conditions. Just as the 
breaking of the package seal constitutes a 
pragmatic act, so the breaking of the poetic 
seal qualifies as the particular kind of 
pragmatic act, which I call the ‘poetic act’. 
Let’s consider this act and its ‘agents’, and 
how they go about acting in the fictional, 
poetic universe. 
 
The consumer of a literary product is 
essentially different from the consumer of a 
‘normal’ commodity (like a car, a piece of 
furniture, or a washing machine; see Mey 
2002: 237). At first glance, we seem to 
recognize the prospective reader as simply a 
buyer/consumer: he or she acquires the 
products of someone else’s literary activity 
and by consuming (‘reading’) them, satisfies 
a personal need, and indirectly, provides the 
author, the producer of the text, with a 
living. However, in the case of the 
production and consumption of poetic works 
(or, in general, literary texts), the 
relationship is not one of pure buying and 
selling (as in the case of a regular 
commodity). In the literary market, authors 
and readers (like producers and consumers 
in the regular market) have different 
positions: authors on the supply side, readers 
on the demand side. However, despite their 
difference in placement they have much 
more in common than regular sellers and 
buyers have. What makes the literary market 
different from the simple exchange of 
commodities, as practiced in the regular 
market, is its collaborative character. 
 
Buying goods in the regular marketplace 
puts us under no special collaborative 
obligations. Of course, for our own benefit, 
we respect the intentions of the producer, as 
expressed in ‘Directions for Use’, 
‘Consumer Manuals’, or similar pieces of 
documentation (including the warranty: a 
legal instrument which safeguards the 
product from production faults and producer 
negligence). But otherwise, no collaboration 
is expected from either side. The ideal sales 
situation is that in which post-trade costs 
and contacts are reduced to a minimum; 
producer and consumer part ways, and 
probably never will meet again. 
 
With respect to the literary market, the 
activities of producing and consuming are 
rather different, as they essentially depend 
on the participants’ collaboration. We don’t 
just buy a book: we buy an author to take 
home with us. The author’s homework of 
producing the poetic text demands to be 
supplemented by our homework as readers. 
Every text needs a reader for its completion 
and full realization; this is why reading 
always is a collaborative activity, taking 
place between author and reader.  
 
A contemporary novelist, Susan Antonia 
Byatt, has expressed this cogently and 
succinctly:  
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[A novel] is made in the head, and has to be 
remade in the head by whoever reads it, who 
will always remake it differently. (Byatt 
1996:214) 
 
In other words, reading is more than a 
passive, pre-scribed and pre-determined use 
of a ‘recreational facility’: it presupposes an 
active re-creation of the poet’s original 
creative work. And this holds for both recent 
and older literature, as two contemporary 
US scholars, Gary Saul Morson and Caryl 
Emerson, writing on the subject of reading 
Shakespeare today, express it: 
 
“… the potential of great works is realized 
by an act of creative understanding from an 
alien perspective reflecting experiences the 
author never knew, and so Shakespeare 
grows in meaning by virtue of what his 
works contain but could only be realized by 
active understanding from a new 
perspective”. (Morson and Emerson 1990: 
310) 
 
By being active collaborators in the poetic 
effort, readers are major players in the 
literary game. Their impact extends beyond 
the acquisition of a text and its subsequent 
assimilation through the visual and 
psychological processes that we usually 
associate with reading. As I will argue in the 
next section, upon entering the poetic 
space/time that the author has created, 
readers become active participants in the 
literary game, rather than mere spectators or 
listeners. This readerly activity, however, 
changes the play; in the final analysis, what 
readers read is their own co-production of 
the text: the text as produced in 
collaboration with its author. In this dialectic 
interaction, the author depends as much on 
the readers (for support of his or her literary 
activity), as the readers depend on the author 
(for guidance in the world of fiction): the 
author provides a ‘script’ that the readers 
have to actively internalize in order to 
successfully take part in the literary game.  
 
 
4. Creating the Poetic Universe: the 
‘Chronotope’ 
 
Let’s now look more closely at what it is 
that an author has to offer his or her 
prospective customers, the readers. In earlier 
work (e.g. Mey 2001, 2002), I have used the 
notion of a fictional ‘space’, into which the 
readers are introduced, led by the hand, so to 
speak, by the author. Readers are delivered 
(‘newly born’, one could say, punning 
metaphorically) into this universe of poetic 
reality, where they meet with the narrative 
characters whose voices determine the 
outlay of the universe in question and carry 
the ongoing action. Such voices may sound 
in unison, or they may clash, when 
characters speak out of turn or their voices 
sound out of tune (See Mey 2001: ch. 7 for 
more details). 
 
What is lacking in this spatial metaphor is of 
course the dimension of time. When space 
and time are combined into ‘time-space’, we 
get what Mikhail Bakhtin has called the 
‘chronotope’, an ‘Einsteinian’ concept that 
unites both the spatial and the temporal 
dimension. As Bakhtin says (by his own 
confession, inspired by Einstein’s theories), 
the chronotope is  
 
“almost a metaphor (almost, but not 
entirely). What counts for us is the fact that 
it expresses the inseparability of space and 
time (time as the fourth dimension of 
space).” (Bakhtin 1982: 84)  
 
With regard to what I refer to as the ‘poetic 
universe’, the chronotope is where the 
voices of the characters meet with, and 
confront each other, in “dialogue and 
dialectics”, as Bakhtin calls it: 
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“Every utterance necessarily elicits a 
response in one form or another … in the 
subsequent speech or behavior of the 
listener… Utterances are not indifferent to 
one another, and are not self-sufficient; they 
are aware of and mutually reflect one 
another." (Bakhtin 1994: 104) 
 
The poet’s activity, and the reader’s dialogic 
and dialectic response, all happen in the 
dialectic chronotope of the literary work. 
 
Brian McHale has complemented this idea 
by pointing out that the text, as such, not 
only creates the spatiotemporal conditions 
for the poetic work to be realized; in 
addition, or perhaps more correctly, the text 
can be seen “as a ‘map’, or ‘model’, whose 
final constitution requires the reader’s active 
response” (McHale 1992: 27). This will be 
the topic of the next section. 
 
 
5. Cognitive Mapping 
 
Monica Fludernik has commented on 
McHale’s proposal as follows: 
 
“McHale proposes to read … poems as 
affording the reader opportunities for 
cognitive mapping, inviting the reader to 
engage creatively with the text, trying out a 
number of avenues of sense-making and, 
ultimately, asking the reader to read herself 
[sic] into the text.” (Fludernik 1996: 304; 
see also McHale 1992: 29) 
 
As I see it, this ‘cognitive mapping’ activity 
is essential to the understanding of any kind 
of poetry, and not just the “postmodernist 
nonsense” poems that McHale is talking 
about in the passage I just cited. And as for 
‘reading oneself into the text’, this 
corresponds pretty much to what I have 
called ‘entering the poetic universe’, aka. the 
Bakhtinian chronotope.  
 
Now, let’s for a moment consider what such 
a mapping could look like, and what it 
presupposes, respectively has as its 
consequences. Reading a map consists 
basically in collating two universes: the one 
universe is that of the world being mapped, 
the other is that of the map. Between these 
two worlds, there is a correspondence, 
expressed in the form of lines and arrows, 
dots and squares, and sometimes partial 
relief and color (to denote differences in 
height and natural composition: rocks, 
water, pastures etc.) What is important for 
the cognitive aspect involved is that the 
map’s reader is able to reproduce the outside 
universe, as represented by the map, by an 
internal universe that corresponds to, but 
also re-creates, the visual data provided by 
the map. One could call this cognitive 
activity a spatiotemporal imaging, and it is 
an essential prerequisite for being able not 
just to read a map, but to cognitively 
reproduce it and enter the universe that is 
mapped. 
 
Such a cognitive reproduction or mapping 
does not imply a bit-by-bit reproduction of 
the individual items represented by the map; 
rather, it consists in a general re-building of 
the outside universe in a mental 
representation, where the individual 
elements may or may not correspond 
directly and one-to-one to the elements of 
the outside world.  
 
For instance, recreating (or ‘cognitively 
mapping’) a city on the basis of previous 
knowledge, a city plan, and possibly some 
tourist brochures will result in very different 
‘cognitive mappings’ for each individual 
doing the mapping. I recall how, having 
been confronted, from an early age, with 
pictures of the Acropolis in Athens, I had 
6 
 
 
Covenant Journal of Language Studies Vol.1 No.1 
constructed a ‘cognitive map’ of the 
building and its surroundings, taking into 
account all the things I had been told by my 
teachers about Greek antiquity, the history 
of Athens, the artistic and political life of the 
city and so on. Yet, on being confronted 
with the ‘real thing’, I had some problems 
relating this decrepit piece of ancient 
architecture to the idealized representation 
that I had been carrying around in my mind. 
While my cognitive mapping was a 
prerequisite for any understanding of the 
Acropolis, yet it was only a necessary, and 
by no means a sufficient condition. 
 
The above considerations suggest that 
neither in literature, cognitive mapping 
(what I have called ‘entering the poetic 
universe’) is the last word. Once inside that 
universe, one has work to do, and this labor 
is necessarily a matter of subjective interests 
and preferences, of personal history and a 
will to overcome and resolve (or else accept 
as unresolved) possible contradictions and 
ambivalences. No Acropolis is the same for 
each human confronted with it: everybody 
has his or her own Acropolis.  
 
As a German historian of culture, the 
numismatist Kurt Lange, writing in the 
tradition of Johann Joachim Winckelmann, 
once said, in every new generation, the 
heritage from the Greeks has to be acquired 
anew (“jede Generation muß das griechische 
Vermächtnis selbst erwerben um es zu 
besitzen”; Lange 1941: 7). From this point 
of view, the act of poetic (re-) creation, the 
pragmatic 'act of reading' (Wolfgang Iser’s 
“Akt des Lesens”; 1976), similarly remains 
a context-bound, space/time determined 
activity; the individual mappings are 
realized against the backdrop of time and 
space that is common to a particular 
generation, a time/space bound society.  
 
Coming to grips with a literary product is 
therefore always a double-edged activity: on 
the one hand, the reader’s personal re-
creation is its necessary condition, but on the 
other, entering the worlds of the poet’s 
imagination and the recipient’s affordances 
poses important, but sometimes difficult-to-
handle constraints on this ‘entering’ (think 
of the problems involved in understanding a 
poem, not to speak of explaining it to 
others).  
 
The poetic act always involves what 
Fludernik (1996: 306) has called a “creative 
reshuffling” of the constituent elements; it’s 
a bit like rotating a kaleidoscope and 
rearranging the different bits in various new 
patterns. But at the same time, there can be 
no doubt that some reshufflings will appeal 
more to me than they do to other persons: 
my reshuffling will be different from, and 
presumably preferable (at least for me!) to 
the mappings that others have created of the 
same space/time bound object. In the Greek 
example, my mapping of the Acropolis will 
therefore re-create ‘my’ Acropolis, as 
distinct from, and preferable to, whatever 
way others may have cognitively mapped it. 
 
 
6. Four Poets and their Chronotopes: 
Drummond, Woolf, Meinke, Updike 
 
This section will illustrate the theoretical 
considerations offered above by appealing to 
a common kind of understanding, a 
‘cognitive mapping’, of four texts: one in 
prose (Woolf), the other three (Drummond, 
Meinke, Updike) in the form of poems.  
 
I will start out with a sonnet by the Brazilian 
modernist poet Carlos Drummond 
d’Andrade (1902-1987), called ‘Fraga e 
sombra’ (‘Crag and shadow’; my 
translation). 
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FRAGA E SOMBRA 
 
Carlos Drummond d’Andrade 
 
A sombra azul da tarde nos confrange 
Baixa, severa, a luz crepuscular. 
Um sino toca, e não saber quem tange 
É como se este som nascesse do ar. 
 
Música breve, noite longa. O alfanje 
Que sono e sonho ceifa devagar 
Mal se desenha fino ante a falange 
Das nuvens esquecidas de passar. 
 
Os dois apenas, entre céu e terra, 
Sentimos o espetáculo do mundo,  
Feito de mar ausente e abstrata serra. 
 
E calcamos em nôs, sob o profundo 
Instinto de existir, outra mais pura 
Vontade de anular a criatura. 
 
(Carlos Drummond d’Andrade, Reunião, 
1969: 177) 
 
 
[Translation: 
 
CRAGS AND SHADOWS 
 
The evening’s blue shadow’s our unmaking, 
low and forbidding, and the light is rare. 
A bell is tolling—knowing not who’s 
making 
the sound appear as born out of the air. 
 
The music stops, the night is long. The 
sickle 
that slowly is dissecting sleep and dream,  
is barely visible against the fickle 
flight of the passing clouds’ forgotten 
stream. 
 
The two of us between the earth and skies 
Barely perceive this worldly show,  
made up of absent sea and abstract highs. 
 
And in ourselves, under our instinct’s woe- 
ful wish to live, we crush the other, purified 
desire to do away with what’s our nature 
side.  
 
Jacob L. Mey (tr.) 
[Engenho Velho, Florianópolis, S.C., Brazil, 
24 August 2001; revised, Austin, Tex., 2 
November 2012] 
 
Drummond’s chronotope is sketched out in 
the first two stanzas: reference is made to 
the ‘night’, following the ‘blue shadow’ of 
the twilight, and illuminated by the faint 
rays of the waning moon. This temporal 
collocation is further developed spatially by 
a bell tolling, ‘low and forbidding’ 
somewhere in the distance, moved by an 
unknown hand. The entire chronotope is 
then cognitively disrupted by the symbolism 
of the moon’s ‘cleavage’, said to ‘dissect 
sleep and dream’: the poet will not allow us, 
readers, to simply enter the cognitive space: 
we are being challenged in our sleep and 
dreams, leading to the ‘unmaking’ that was 
announced in the first line of the poem. This 
notion is then developed in the terzines: the 
‘worldly show’ of the ‘passing clouds’ is 
given an otherworldly interpretation: the 
cognitive map leads us straight into the final 
unmaking of ‘our instinct’s woeful wish to 
live’, doing away with nature altogether in a 
‘purifying’ move. The chronotope’s 
cognitive circle is closed: the bells that 
tolled in the beginning are now signaling the 
end of our existence ‘between earth and 
skies’, in the ‘worldly show’ where the ‘sea 
[is] absent’ and ‘the mountain’s highs’ [are] 
‘abstract[ions]’. 
 
What makes the poem different from an 
everyday speculation about life and death is 
our will to follow its cognitive path, along 
with the poet, thus transforming, in an active 
readerly effort, Drummond’s sonnet into a 
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metaphysical statement. This is done 
through the cognitive transformation of the 
poem’s chronotope, by which our lives are 
re-cognized as being pathways to the end of 
all time/space.  
 
The cognitive space/time in this sonnet is 
clearly limited to the poet’s whose voice we 
hear in the reflections of ‘crag and dusk’, 
and who reappears in the first person plural 
of the two closing stanzas. By contrast, the 
British writer Virginia Woolf uses a 
different technique in her short novel 
Jacob’s Room. The room that is alluded to 
in the title is clearly not just a place in time, 
a chronotope that changes in the course of 
the narration. Rather, one could call it a 
‘virtual’ space/time, a chronotope whose 
dimensions are related to the protagonist, 
Jacob Flanders, who “swims into sight” and 
vanishes again, as one of Woolf’s critics has 
remarked. Small vignettes characterize the 
various dimensions of the actual places 
where things happen; one such place is the 
hallway in one of Jacob’s lodgings, where 
he has “taken up” with Florinda, “one of 
those little prostitutes” (Woolf 1978: 94).  
 
The actants in this chronotope are not so 
much Jacob and Florinda themselves as their 
virtual presences in the hallway, where a 
letter is lying on the table. What happens in 
the sequel is centered around this letter and 
its actual place, “under the lamp between the 
biscuit-tin and the tobacco-box” (ibid.) This 
placement is essential for evoking the 
chronotope where the letter plays the role of 
a participant in the action. Jacob had 
recognized “the hand on the envelope” as 
being his mother, Betty Flanders’, and 
probably because he recognized “the hand”, 
decides not to open the envelope, but leaves 
it unread on the sitting-room table, while he 
and Florinda go into the bedroom and “shut 
the door behind them” (ibid.). 
 
In this passage, Woolf carefully sets up two 
chronotopes, two separate fictional 
time/spaces: the one inside the bedroom and 
the other outside, in the sitting room. The 
former contains “the obscene thing: the 
alarming presence” of Jacob “stretched with 
Florinda”, a woman about whom we know 
next to nothing, except that she can’t spell, 
is scatterbrained, and in the end deserts 
Jacob for another man. As such, she barely 
enters the chronotope to vanish almost 
immediately from the “room” that is 
“Jacob’s”. The other, the now-empty sitting 
room, is characterized by the fictional 
perspective, the ‘vanishing point’, from 
which we readers perceive the events going 
on behind the bedroom’s closed door.  
 
Since initially there are no characters 
present, the sitting room is a cognitively 
neutral portion of “Jacob’s room”: the 
“sitting room neither knew nor cared”, as 
Woolf puts it. But on closer inspection, this 
empty space becomes populated by a 
cognitive presence, namely Jacobs’s mother 
Betty Flanders’, whose “hand” is still on the 
table. And Betty does “know” and “cares”, 
listening to the sounds coming from the 
other space, courageously trying to explain 
them away as normal in “old houses” that 
are full of rats, where the “wood is dry”, and 
“little creaks and sudden stirs” are to be 
expected.  
 
A cognitive map is deployed in front of us, 
by means of which Woolf makes us aware 
of this presence by evoking Betty’s letter: 
even though we are not told its contents, we 
are guided towards an understanding by way 
of the author’s description. We read the 
letter, not in the literal sense of opening it 
and perusing its contents, but in the sense 
that we perceive its presence on the table as 
that of Jacob’s mother, whose “hand” has 
been recognized on the envelope and whose 
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presence has been explicitly rejected and 
shut out.  
 
Here is how Woolf’s creates this particular 
chronotope: 
 
“The sitting room neither knew nor cared. 
The door was shut; and to suppose that 
wood, when it creaks, transmits anything 
save that rats are busy and wood dry is 
childish. These old houses are only brick 
and wood, soaked in human sweat, grained 
with human dirt. But if the pale blue 
envelope lying by the biscuit-box had the 
feelings of a mother, the heart was torn by 
the little creak, the sudden stir. Behind the 
door was the obscene thing, the alarming 
presence, and terror would come over her as 
at death, or the birth of a child”. (1978: 94) 
 
It is important to note that we enter this 
fictional space thanks to what Fludernik has 
calls our “perceiving consciousness” 
(1993:391) – that which I referred to as the 
‘cognitive map’ that enables us to find our 
way through the labyrinth of voices and 
characters. We are dealing here with “a 
reading process in which the reader takes an 
internal position on events (as if through a 
witness)”, rather than from an external 
position, “a mere camera-eye” (ibid.). This 
‘internal’ reader position does not relate to 
any externally perceived character on stage: 
what we do perceive, in the fictional 
time/space, is an ‘implicit’ character: a 
lifeless object, an envelope “lying by the 
biscuit-box”, which miraculously blossoms 
out before the reader’s eyes, transforming 
itself into a representation of a living person 
(a “phantom”, as Woolf calls it herself; 
1978: 92): the sender of the pale blue 
envelope and writer of its contents, Jacob’s 
mother, Mrs. Betty Flanders.  
 
In Fludernik’s words, “[t]he reader is invited 
to see the fictional world through the eyes of 
a ‘reflector’ character” (1993:391; the 
expression ‘reflector’ character is due to 
Fludernik’s mentor, Franz Karl Stanzel; 
1984). The letter representing Jacob’s 
mother is such a ‘reflector’: it represents our 
‘eyes’ by the way we identify, and reflect 
on, the letter’s sender in the fictional space 
of the sitting room; with her, we start 
imagining, and worrying about, the events 
happening between the couple in that other 
fictional space, the bedroom. 
 
The cognitive map that we are following as 
our guide-line through the maze of spaces 
and times is personified here as a letter and 
attributed ‘reflecting’ powers. At the same 
time, the letter symbolizes our failing ability 
to fully realize the chronotope’s potential: 
like the letter, we too cannot change the 
course of events. Jacob’s mother can write a 
letter, but it needs an outside reader to make 
that letter come alive; as long as it is lying 
unopened by the biscuit-box, it is powerless, 
both in the fictional and in the real world.  
 
My third example of a cognitive mapping 
stems again from the world of poetry, this 
time represented by a living US author, 
Peter Meinke, now retired from his teaching 
position in South Florida, and known for a 
number of very accessible but at the same 
time profound and thoughtful collections of 
poems. The one I’m quoting below, 
‘Surfaces’, is from his collection Liquid 
Paper (1991 [1970]). 
 
Surfaces 
 
 darling 
you are not at all 
like a pool or a rose 
my thoughts do not dart in your depths 
like cool goldfish 
nor does your skin suggest petals 
you are not like anything (except perhaps 
my idea of what you are like 
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I think you are like 
what our children need to grow beautiful 
what I need to be most myself) 
when the moon comes out I do not think of you 
but sometimes you remind me of the moon: 
your surfaces are unbelievably real 
 
This is how I feel about you: 
suppose 
on the surface of a rippling pool 
the moon shone clearly reflected 
like a yellow rose 
then 
if a cloud floated over it 
 I would hate the sky 
 
(Meinke 1991: 54; originally published in The 
New Republic 163(13), September 26, 1970, p. 
22). 
 
Compared with the realistic/metaphysical 
universe that we meet in Drummond’s 
poems, or with the post-
impressionistic/surrealist prose of Woolf’s 
short novels, Meinke’s poem hearkens back 
to an entirely different tradition, one I would 
call symbolic/metaphorical, often identified 
with Russian poets such as Anna 
Akhmatova or Osip Mandelshtam. Meinke’s 
space/time dimensions are particular to their 
occasional occurrence in the poem, which 
forms a single self-contained unit whose 
references are bound by the reflections and 
interactions of the poet with himself. Here, 
space and time are not realistic dimensions: 
they are poetic, ‘made up’, in the original 
sense of the word (the Greek verb poiein 
means ‘to make, create’). The descriptions 
do not serve as illustrations of reality; they 
are pointers to an inner space and time, 
where the author collects his thoughts and 
feelings around the apostrophized “darling” 
of the first line: “you are not at all like …” 
etc.  
 
What at first sight or hearing may appear 
strange, viz. the fact that the poet starts out 
with a ‘negative’ description of the beloved 
object (“darling”) turns out to be the major 
creative (‘poetic’) feature of this short poem, 
in addition to providing us with the 
cognitive mappings needed to understand 
the poet’s intentions. On the “surface” of it, 
Meinke’s poem describes the feeling of a 
man in love with his wife, telling her all the 
things she is not, like “a pool or a rose”; he 
even tells her that he is not thinking of her 
“when the moon comes out”. Clearly, there 
must be a reason for this ‘negative’ 
reflection, or else we readers may ask the 
author the inevitable question: “So what?” 
Alternatively, we might dismiss his entire 
poetic enterprise by telling Meinke “Thanks 
for letting us know”.  But in doing so, we 
would miss an important clue to 
understanding this poem. The cognitive 
mapping that is involved here turns precisely 
around the ’negative’ character of the 
descriptions used. What we are faced with 
here is the poem’s “alienating effect”, also 
called ‘bestrangement’; to quote the Russian 
formalist poet and poetic theoretician Viktor 
B. Shklovsky, who is among the first to have 
used this concept: 
  
 “The point of art is to make us see things as 
they are seen, not as they are recognized; the 
way to do this is to make things unfamiliar 
and render their perception difficult.” 
(1965:14; [1971]).  
 
Shklovsky’s own term for this alienating 
effect is the “technique of making strange, 
of ‘bestrangement’” (priëm ostranenija, 
often translated as ‘defamiliarization’, 
‘making unfamiliar’) (ibid.). As the Danish 
painter/poet/sculptor Per Kirkeby once 
expressed it: “at intervals, the earth has to be 
made flat in order that we may see clearly” 
(1993: 14). 
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By telling us what is not, the poet draws our 
attention to what is, and does so much more 
effectively than if he had simply told us that 
his wife is like a rose, or a pool. Such 
objects are familiar to us, and for that reason 
not very exciting or illuminative: “A rose is 
a rose is a rose ...” – the philosophers 
echoing Shakespeare. So, when the poet tells 
his wife that she “remind[s him] of the 
moon”, he immediately ‘defamiliarizes’ this 
reference by adding that her “surfaces are 
unbelievably real”. Again, this 
defamiliarization presupposes the familiarity 
of the real which it negates; but also, the 
very reason that the poet permits himself to 
choose the devious path of alienation is that 
the ‘normal’ way of poetic self-expression is 
felt to be just too familiar. By reiterating his 
‘bestranging’ expressions, the poet 
transforms the negative descriptions into a 
positive characteristic of the beloved person.  
 
On the other hand, the ‘bestrangement’ 
presupposes the existence of a ‘cognitive 
map’ of the kind we discussed earlier. There 
has to be, in the readership, a willingness to 
go along with the poet in his, at first blush 
rather heavy-handed, delving deeper and 
deeper into the metaphorical depths of 
alienation. Not satisfied with simply stating 
that his wife is not a rose, he has to spell out 
that her skin “suggests no petals”; not only 
is she not a pool, but we are told that his 
“thoughts do not dart about in [her] depths 
like cool goldfish”. The rich, metaphoric 
terms of poetic description are deliberately 
negated and turned into their opposites in a 
seemingly non-poetic, negative account. 
Through alienation, the poetic metaphors are 
turned into their corresponding, realistic 
metonyms.  
 
As to us readers, having become 
accomplices to the act of alienation, we are 
asked to perform a ‘negation’s negation’, in 
Friedrich Engels’ dialectic terminology. By 
denying what the alienation negates, we 
perform a positive act of affirmation, 
confirming the poet’s original intention of 
paying a poetic attribute to his wife. In the 
end, this negative ‘defamiliarization’ serves 
to underscore the familiar, positive aspects 
of a husband’s feelings: his wife is not like 
anything familiar (read: trivial), rather, she 
is unique; for like the moon’s, her “surfaces 
are unbelievably real”.  
 
It is as if the author encourages the reader 
not to follow any well-known cognitive 
paths, not to explore any recognizable 
cognitive “depths”: the familiar and worn 
metaphors of “rose” and “pool” are turned 
around, and instead of recognizing the 
familiar, we concentrate on seeing the 
unfamiliar, bestranged, “unbelievable 
surfaces” and experiencing the effect they 
have on us. “Seeing, not recognizing”, is 
what ostranenije, defamiliarization, is all 
about, as Shklovskij himself admonishes us 
(ibid.; Steffensen 1973: 137). And Reuven 
Tsur elucidates: “In art, it is our experience 
of the process of construction that counts, 
not the finished product. ‘Art exists that one 
may recover the sensation of life; it exists to 
make one feel things, to make the stone 
stony’” (Tsur 2009: 399; emphasis in 
original).  
 
In this particular case, moreover, our active 
identification with the text, as outlined by 
the cognitive paths provided by the poet, is 
facilitated by the real world context of the 
poem’s original setting. At the time of its 
writing, the surface of the moon, in all its 
“unbelievable reality”, had just entered our 
common ‘story-external consciousness’ (cf. 
Fludernik 1993:391): the first moon landing 
had happened in 1969, about a year prior to 
the poem’s first publication in 1970. 
 
As a contrast to Meinke’s ‘defamiliarizing’ 
technique, let me finally quote a poem by 
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another US writer, the late John Updike 
(1932-2009), who is mostly known for his 
short stories and novels (among the latter, 
the famous Rabbit tetralogy). Nobody would 
contest my assertion that Updike is a 
realistic author, describing life and mores 
among middle class intellectuals in the 
Northeastern United States; yet, even his 
‘surfaces’, like Meinke’s, reveal more than 
they seem to. But precisely because of the 
easy-going, apparently unproblematic nature 
of Updike’s writing, finding a proper 
cognitive guide through his work may be 
more difficult than initially assumed. Here is 
one of his poems, telling us about a father’s 
proud presence at the graduation of one of 
his three children in his first marriage: 
 
Commencement, Pingree School 
 
Among these North Shore tennis tans I sit,  
In seersucker dressed, in small things fit;  
Within a lovely tent of white I wait  
To see my lovely daughter graduate.  
 
Slim boughs of blossom tap the tent and 
stamp  
Their shadows like a bower on the cloth.  
The brides in twos glide down the grassy 
ramp  
To graduation's candle, moth and moth.  
 
The Master makes his harrumphs. Music. 
Prayer.  
Demure and close in rows, the seniors sway.  
Class loyalty solidifies the air.  
At every name, a body wends her way  
 
Through greenhouse shade and sweet heat to 
receive  
A paper of divorce and endless leave.  
As each accepts the kiss acádemic,  
Up pops a Daddy with a Nikon. Click. 
 
John Updike (1973) ‘Commencement, 
Pingree School’ 
 
One could call this short poem a purely 
descriptive one, were it not for the typically 
updikean, hidden clues that the author has 
distributed throughout the text. These clues 
constitute the cognitive map that leads us to 
a full understanding of the poet’s intentions 
and the way he considers himself: an 
appropriately, “seersucker dressed” person 
among the “North Shore” society of “tennis 
tans” (his equals, and yet…); the map is 
made up by the poet’s ‘seeing’ of the whole 
ceremony of commencement at an 
expensive, private girls’ school in the South 
Hamilton, Mass., community. The 
description includes the poet himself, but at 
a distance, seen from the outside as a father 
attending his “lovely daughter”’s 
graduation. His mental distance from the 
‘tennis tans’ is palpable, as is the ironic 
description in one word (“harrumphs”) of 
the headmaster’s speech.  
 
The most telling of the clues is where the 
poet invites us to see the commencement 
ceremony as a ‘rite of passage’, a ritual in 
which an individual changes his or her life 
status; the change is often marked by 
humiliating or painful exercises, imposed on 
he neophyte by the accepting community. In 
this particular instance, Updike (as so often) 
pulls the ‘death card’: this commencement’s 
rite of passage is seen as a dangerous 
crossing of a threshold, a jump from one 
existential phase to another (like the famous 
Tuffatore, the ‘Diver' from the Paestum 
grave monument, symbolizing his transition 
by a plunge into the waters of the hereafter). 
In the poem, the girls are depicted as 
“moths”, attracted by the burning flame of 
“graduation’s candle”, only to receive what? 
A “kiss acádemic” (notice the odd accent), 
understood as a bizarre welcome symbol, or 
probably more like a kiss of death, ‘the kiss 
of the spider woman’ (think of William 
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Hurt’s immortal role in the 1985 movie of 
that title). 
 
The cognitive map is thus a guide to 
Updike’s ‘story within a story’: the 
graduation is more than it seems to be (read: 
a portentous event, with shades of mortality 
and hidden sexuality), and also less than it 
seems (read: the poet making a bit fun of 
himself, telling the readers not to take all 
this too seriously and certainly not to believe 
the poet on his word; look, he couldn’t even 
find a suitable rhyme in the penultimate line, 
had to change the stress in a word, just like 
we do in doggerel and birthday party 
verse!). And the very last, throw-away line 
with its “Click” tells it all; it’s like a 
postcard sent home by the most ordinary of 
tourists: ” Been there, done the thing, got the 
picture”. 
 
Compared to his contemporary Peter 
Meinke and his predecessors Drummond 
and Woolf, John Updike at first blush strikes 
us as more ‘direct’, less symbolic; realistic 
rather than surrealist. But beware: here, as 
elsewhere, the cognitive path that we are 
following is treacherously simple because of 
the very superficiality of the poet’s 
descriptions, such that initially, we are prone 
to discard the poem as a rather uninteresting 
depiction of a wholly family-circumscribed 
social event: “my lovely daughter’s lovely 
graduation”. While in Meinke’s poem, the 
clues were so to speak, underlined (he tells 
us what his wife is not, and so on), and 
while Woolf, as is her wont, doesn’t even 
bother to provide any clues, Updike uses his 
famous distancing irony to convey the 
message: the poet is not just attending a run-
of-the-mill graduating ceremony: listening 
to the Master’s “harrumphs” and the 
subsequent “music” and “prayer”, watching 
the graduating seniors  
“swaying in rows” and “wending their 
ways”, “gliding down the grassy ramp”; 
rather, he wants us to join him in the social 
commentary that this poem, despite its 
smooth melodic lines, ruggedly maintains. It 
is expressed through the basso continuo of 
the author’s hidden voice, in his implicit 
critique of the North Shore tennis people, of 
the bridal-like outfits of the seniors, of the 
ceremony’s “solidified air” of “[upper 
middle] class loyalty”, all of which suggest a 
double-entendre, without which the poem 
indeed would be a banal exercise in socialite 
descriptivism. 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
In this contribution, I have tried to place a 
particular kind of producer/consumer 
activity involving the ‘poetic act’ within the 
contextual frame of cognitive references 
called the ‘fictional universe’. This poetic 
‘total context’ has been shown to be the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the 
successful implementation of the authors’ 
and readers’ poetic activities, understood as 
the performance of a co-creative, authorial 
as well as readerly, ‘pragmatic act’, resulting 
in the creation of the literary work. The 
examples used were taken from modern 
fiction and poetry; they showed that the 
inclusion of the reader as a co-creator of the 
poetic work, “present at its creation”, is 
absolutely necessary to capture the work’s 
workings and effects.  
 
To clarify these processes, I have used the 
metaphor of the ‘cognitive/pragmatic map’, 
a concept which allows us to trace the 
activities in question, and see how they 
guide us towards the goal of understanding, 
and empathizing with, the poetic work. 
 
The importance of this way of looking at the 
literary process is that it unites the 
pragmatic and the cognitive aspects that are 
involved in the poetic enterprise. Pragmatic, 
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since it shows us the need to involve the 
user actively in the process. Cognitive, 
because it demonstrates the need to involve 
a common author/reader mental activity, 
operating in both space and time, the 
Bakhtinian ‘chronotope’, realized as a 
cognitive mapping of places and times in 
which the co-creators are able to find, and 
define, their relationships. Poetic acting is 
thereby removed from the exclusive sphere 
of the individualistic, ego-oriented 
experience of the reader, and transformed 
into the collaborative activity of authors and 
their readers; the latter, as co-authors, in 
their turn dialectically influence the 
reception and performance of the literary 
work, even long after its contemporary, 
original authors and readers have left the 
scene. 
 
1(school) Pingree School, South Hamilton, 
MA 01982 
 
2 (school) Here is the ‘official’ version of 
the last stanza (from Updike’s Collected 
Poems: 
Through greenhouse shade and rustle to 
receive  
A paper of divorce and endless leave.  
As each accepts her scroll of rhetoric,  
Up pops a Daddy with a Nikon. Click. 
 
3 (verse) See comment earlier. Twenty years 
later, Updike changed the line to produce a 
more civilized poetic effect, when he revised 
the poem for inclusion in his Collected 
Poems. 
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